Obama, Larry Sinclair, limousine, P Multani, cocaine, gay sex, illegal aliens

To read the limo driver story questions and answers between
Citizen Wells and Larry Sinclair, click here:

https://citizenwells.wordpress.com/2008/07/21/limo-driver-multani-larry-sinclair-five-star-limousine-service-chicago-drugs-sex-obama-down-low-citizen-wells-blog-sinclair-news-conference/

 

 

Larry Sinclair has made allegations that he had multiple encounters with Barack Obama from November 3 through November 8 1999. One of the encounters was alleged to be in a limousine from 5 Star Limousine Service in Chicago. Sinclair states that the limousine driver’s name is P Multani. Sinclair has also stated that in the past he has helped illegal aliens. There was a Paramjit Singh Multani, from India, in this country illegally and he was in Chicago around the time of the alleged limousine encounter. Is Larry Sinclair using information he had about an illegal alien and Barack Obama’s schedule to fabricate this story or is this story real.

Below is a petition involving a P Multani. Is this the man Larry Sinclair is referring to and did he drive a limousine?

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 25, 2006

Decided July 28, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1732

PARAMJIT SINGH MULTANI,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A29 396 661

O R D E R

This petition for review requires us to untangle a snarl of procedural steps that

the petitioner, Paramjit Singh Multani, has created for us and the immigration

authorities. Multani would like his removal proceedings stayed or administratively

closed while his wife appeals from the revocation of the approval of her I-130 petition,

which entitled Multani to a visa based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Relying on

Multani’s record of “flouting” the immigration laws in various ways, the IJ denied this

request; indeed, he went further and ordered that Multani be deported to India.

Multani petitioned for review. We conclude that we have jurisdiction over this petition.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Board of Immigration Appeals has, since argument

in this case, vacated the revocation of the I-130 petition and remanded for further

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53

No. 05-1732 Page 2

proceedings on the bona fides of the marriage, we see nothing in the decision of the IJ

or the BIA before us that would justify granting the petition for review. Multani must

therefore seek whatever further relief may be available to him from the BIA or the

appropriate agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

I

Multani, a citizen of India, first entered the United States illegally in 1987. He

was arrested by immigration officials in Florida in 1991, at which time the former

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC)

charging him with deportability for illegally entering the United States. Multani failed

to appear at his hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. In 1996, he turned up

in California, where he applied for asylum. In that application (in which Multani used

a shortened version of his name, Paramjit Singh), he claimed that he was tortured and

beaten in India in 1993, and that he first entered the United States in 1994. He made

no mention of his prior immigration proceedings. The application was denied and

Multani received another OSC, based on illegal entry. Once again, Multani failed to

attend his deportation hearing, and once again, he was ordered deported in absentia.

Then in 1998, Multani was again found in the United States and charged with

deportability for entering the country illegally. This time, a warrant for his deportation

was issued, but in February 1999 he sent a letter to the INS, notifying it that he had

“self-deported” to Canada and that the INS was “not to bother” him at his new address.

Apparently Canada was not to his liking, because he illegally reentered the

United States eight months later. The INS caught up with him quickly and charged

him with removability for the illegal reentry. Multani denied that he was removable

and requested an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status. His case was

transferred to Chicago, and in October 2000, the IJ ordered him deported to India.

Multani then filed a motion to reopen his case, arguing that he was denied an

opportunity to apply to have his status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident,

based on an approved I-130 petition filed by his wife, who was a U.S. citizen. Multani

concurrently applied to adjust his status, but his application falsely claimed that he

had never previously been deported. At the same time, Multani appealed the IJ’s

October 2000 decision to the BIA, which remanded his case so that the IJ could

consider his application for adjustment of status.

At the hearing on Multani’s application to adjust his status, the IJ informed him

that because of his “self-deportation” in 1999, he was ineligible to adjust status and

become a permanent resident. Multani’s attorney, however, then informed the IJ that

four days earlier, he had filed an I-212 application on Multani’s behalf, requesting

permission for Multani to reapply for admission to the United States after deportation.

The IJ decided to continue the hearing. Before it resumed, the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) (a bureau of DHS) revoked the I-130 visa

petition that Multani’s wife had filed. When the status adjustment hearing resumed,

No. 05-1732 Page 3

Multani requested that the IJ continue his case, pending resolution of an appeal of the

visa revocation. As we noted above, on April 7, 2006, the BIA ruled favorably on

Multani’s appeal, ordering “the District Director to provide the petitioner an additional

opportunity to submit evidence in support of the bona fides of the marriage.” The BIA’s

order does not comment on any other aspect of the case, although it includes a footnote

detailing the various names that DHS asserts Multani has used. Interestingly, the

BIA’s order of April 7 identifies him as “Paramjit Singh,” not as Multani. We think it

is fair to conclude, from counsel’s submission of the Board’s April 7 order, that he

concedes that he has used both names.

Back in 2003, however, the IJ refused Multani’s request to continue the case or

to adjust his status; instead, he issued an order dated June 18, 2004, that concluded

with the following language: “IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s request for acontinuance be denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent be deported from

the United States to India on the charge contained in the Notice to Appear.” The IJ

explained in the order that Multani’s record was “replete with misrepresentations,

deceptions, and utter disregard for the laws of the United States.” The IJ recognized

that he had discretion whether to grant Multani’s request for a continuance, but that

given Multani’s history, this relief was not warranted, nor was any further delay in

resolving the case as a whole.

Multani appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ had violated his due process

rights by not acting impartially, and that the IJ abused his discretion by denying a

continuance knowing that Multani’s visa had been “revoked in violation of the law.”

Unmoved, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. Foreshadowing its later ruling in the visa

appeal, it expressed concern about the revocation of Multani’s marriage visa, noting

that the only apparent basis for that action was that Multani was “the kind of person

who would enter into a sham marriage.” This, it concluded, would be an improper

reason for such an action. Nevertheless, the BIA found that Multani did not merit

discretionary relief, because he “flout[ed] immigration laws” by making

misrepresentations in his application, failing to appear for prior hearings, and twice

ignoring deportation orders. The BIA’s order concludes with the statement

“[a]ccordingly, the appeal is dismissed.”

II

The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Multani’s

challenge to the IJ’s denial of his request for a continuance pending his appeal of the

revocation of the marriage visa. It argues further that we lack jurisdiction to review

the IJ’s decision to deny Multani’s application for adjustment of status. It is true that

the governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which is entitled “denials of

discretionary relief” says that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law … and

except as provided in subparagraph (D), … no court shall have jurisdiction to review…

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland

No. 05-1732 Page 4

Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security….” See

Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating in dicta that ordinary

denials of continuances are covered by the statutory ban on judicial review); Yerkovich

v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 2004); but see Zafar v. U.S. Attorney General,

426 F.3d 1330, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the authority for an IJ to grant

a continuance is derived solely from regulations promulgated by the INS, and thus the

ban on judicial review does not extend to rulings on motions for continuances). In some

situations, however, the denial of a continuance is functionally the final substantive

order in the case. See Subhan, 383 F.3d at 595-96; see also Benslimane v. Gonzales,

430 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2005). In those situations, we have held that substance

should prevail over form, and that we have the power to review the ultimate decision

in the case.

In its zeal to protect the Attorney General’s discretion, however, the government

has overlooked the fact that, in the final analysis, this is not a petition for review of the

denial of a continuance. It is a petition from the final order commanding that Multani

be deported to India. As is often the case, Multani is complaining that various

procedural steps along the way to that outcome require reversal. But that does not

mean that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the deportation order, as we normally

do under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). See Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1057 (7th Cir.

2005) (noting that scope of appellate review now includes review of constitutional

claims and questions of law). Our jurisdiction over this petition is secure, even though

there may be particular rulings that receive special deference.

Unfortunately for Multani, however, this procedural victory is of little avail. His

protestations about his inability to gather together all of his prior records ring hollow,

especially since he has now conceded the fact that “Paramjit Singh Multani” (whose

case was docketed as A29 396 661 by DHS) and “Paramjit Singh (whose case was

docketed as A75 019 376 by DHS) are one and the same person. The IJ did not abuse

his discretion when he found that Multani did not merit either a continuance or any

other kind of discretionary relief. We have no reason to second-guess the IJ’s finding

that Multani’s “record is replete with misrepresentations, deceptions, and utter

disregard for the laws of the United States.” Finally, we reject Multani’s claim that the

proceedings before the IJ infringed his due process rights. Among other problems with

this argument is the fact that an alien’s right to due process does not extend to

proceedings that provide only discretionary relief. See Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d658, 662 (7th Cir. 2006); Hamdan, 425 F.3d at 1060-61. In addition, Multani has given

us no reason to think that the IJ and the BIA were anything but impartial and

conscientious.

The petition for review is DENIED.